gorebrush wrote: » IPS is usually placed inline - so one cable in, one out. Inline means that packets can be stopped and dropped transparently if they are deemed to be naughty. IDS on the other hand is placed somewhere away from the production network, and in general if a Cisco network is involved, I know that a SPAN port is configured to blindly send all traffic to the IDS. The difference here is that the IDS can only generate alerts based on traffic it has inspected, and does not have the ability to stop it.
docrice wrote: » It boils down to two major considerations: 1) Inline or not. Is the IPS system going to be treated essentially as a set-and-forget approach with blind trust to the configured ruleset and factory tuning? Is the purpose to actually detect threats at a low-level, baseline the network, analyze events, and apply appropriate incident response processes? Most IPS users fall into one or the other. IPS systems have a higher potential of false positives depending on customer tuning and expected traffic conditions and payloads. If the vendor gets it wrong with their rules, a false positive means an inline operation will block legitimate traffic. On the other hand, an overly-relaxed ruleset will miss attacks. Intrusion prevention and detection is not the same as firewall management, although many network engineers tend to treat it as such. 2) What are you trying to protect? Server/application assets? Clients? What are the risk values over these and their priorities? What is the size of the staff to watch over this system and how familiar are they with this technology? What is the required inspection throughput? The latter will also be dependent on how much inspection you plan to do when sizing your sensors and figuring the cost.