Ugh, what a terrible title. Anyway.
I'm not testing if this is a valid proposal (although anyone is more than welcome to weigh in on that). I'll be emailing a course mentor regarding that. What I'm concerned about is the feasibility of the method I came up with of securing the edge router:
So my idea was setting up the network a small branch office for a fictitious corporation. Cheaply, securely.
Basically I'd go through after basic installation of PCs, securing the network (port-security on the switch, etc). For the edge, in order for this to be a cheap turnup (first branch office, tentative expansion), rather than having its own firewall, etc, I'd configure a crypto P2P vpn back to the corp office over DSL (probably business class, I'd think), configure a /32 route out the DSL interface to bring up the tunnel and a /0 over the tunnel to the corporate infrastructure which is better equipped for firewalls, content filtering, whatever (beyond my scope). Then an ACL applied inbound on the dsl interface denying any traffic that's not coming from the other endpoint of the tunnel.
My theory that the ACL blocks
everything not coming from the corporate router (specifically the 1 address configured on the branch router as 'tunnel destination X'). Combined with then VPN dropping non-encrypted traffic coming in, this seems to be pretty secure (perhaps add an ACL to the VTY lines to prevent spoofing? Spoofing is a bit confusing)
Conscious incompetence is a terrible thing...
I'm POSITIVE there's flaws in this, and perhaps I'm overthinking this ("write to the rubric", right?), but I don't want something unrealistic or some OBVIOUS that I'm missing so I look like an idiot even suggesting that the C-level person or whoever the project sponsor is would even suggest something like that (even though the taskstream people probably wouldn't even know).